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Contending explanations about interest in politics in two new democracies: Greece and Spain

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1- Introduction

The starting point of this research dates back to my first visit to Athens in September 1993. The climate of political effervescence that preceded the Greek general elections in those days was quite shocking for somebody used to the way these events are usually lived in Spain. This atmosphere was clearly reflected in the public opinion polls when Greeks were asked about their level of interest in politics. What I did not know then was that I had the privilege of living what was to be the last electoral period of that kind for years to come. After 1993 interest in politics started to decline gradually and one could say that politics in Greece started to become rather different to what it had been during the eighties and early nineties. Why were the Greeks so interested in politics until 1993 while the citizens of Spain - another South European new democracy – declare themselves to be so indifferent towards politics since the seventies? Why did Greeks stop being interested in politics after that date? In other words, my objectives have been to find out why the levels of interest in politics in Spain and Greece were so different during the eighties and early nineties and why the evolution of this attitude has been so different in the two countries[1].

Although these two countries have barely ever been subject of a two case comparison, several contending explanations have been suggested by the literature about political culture of each of the countries or about the political culture of new democracies[2]. The two that have found the biggest echo are the one that focuses on the historical legacies of a country, and the one that traces the origins of the peculiar political culture of a country to the period of transition to democracy. In the following pages I will analyze to what extent each of these explanations is well suited to understand both the Greek and the Spanish political culture in what refers to the levels and evolution of interest in politics as declared by citizens. Furthermore, I will try to argue that more attention should be paid to a third kind of explanation; namely, the one that focuses on day to day politics since the period of transition until nowadays.

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[1] In my PhD. research I also addressed a third point that will not be dealt with here. It referred to the meaning of "being interested in politics" in the two countries.

[2] The only comparative study between Greece and Spain that I know of is Kaminis' study of the two constitutional processes (1993). For a study of political disaffection in new democracies see Torcal (2003).

2- Levels and evolution of interest in politics in Greece and Spain

With regard to the aggregate levels of interest in politics the question is: Why did *more than half* of the Greek population over 18 declare, during the eighties and beginning of the nineties, that they were very or quite interested in politics, while *just one fourth* of the Spanish population shared the same attitude? (graph 1)[3].

Graph 1: Levels and evolution of interest in politics in Spain and Greece, 1983-2002

The high levels of political interest amongst the Greeks and the low levels of the Spaniards were not only evident when we compare these two countries but were confirmed also when compared to other countries. Within the European Union, Greece has been one of the EU countries with *above* average level of interest in politics while Spain has been amongst those *below* the average (graph 2).

Graph 2: Interest in politics in Spain and Greece within the EU, 1983-1998

In terms of the evolution of trends the question I intend to answer is: Why did interest in politics *decrease* amongst the Greeks after 1993, while it remained quite stable among the Spaniards? In Greece the percentage of citizens interested in politics has fallen by 20 points between 1993 and 2002 while in Spain it has remained at similar levels (graphs 1 and 2). In September 1993 still 52% of the Greeks declared to be interested in politics but in June 1994 this proportion had fallen to 40% and in March 2002 to 34%. On the contrary, in Spain the percentage of citizens interested in politics has remained quite stable since the beginning of the eighties until nowadays. In May 1983 24% of the Spanish population above 18 declared to be interested in politics while in March 2002 this percentage was still quite similar, 22%, without having suffered big oscillations in between. The European Social Survey carried out in 2002-2003 (not included in the graphs) reveals the following aggregate percentages for Greece and Spain respectively: 31% and 21%.

[3] See annex for the list of surveys used in these analyses.

3- What is important about "interest in politics"?

When we refer to the political culture of a society this includes several attitudes towards politics that refer to different aspects. Some of them refer to whether citizens *support the democratic regime* or not, others have to do with whether citizens are *satisfied with the way the democratic regime works*, others refer to the *evaluation of specific political outcomes*, another group of attitudes has to do with whether *politicians are perceived as trustworthy and responsive* to citizens' demands. In the case of interest in politics, we are in front of an attitude that, first of all, deals with *politics in general* instead of with an aspect of politics in particular, and secondly, it does not necessarily imply a positive attitude towards politics but just "interest". The implications of the attitude of being interested in politics have been stressed by both the literature on democratic theory, the literature on political participation, as well as by the literature on political psychology.

Interest in politics is important for the substance of democracy itself. In this sense, one may be left wondering what is the meaning of popular sovereignty and citizenship if citizens are not interested in politics (Neumann, 1986:9; Hahn, 1993:317; Held, 1993:58; Melville, 1993:58). Interest in politics is also relevant as an indicator of how much information citizens have about politics and how they manage this information. More specifically, interest in politics is said to help citizens process complex information. In other words, interest in politics is an indicator of citizens' capacity to make sense of politics (Lodge and Taber, 2000; McGraw, 2000; Kuklinski et al, 2001:413). This is why this attitude has a positive influence on the formation, stability and coherence of political opinions and on the making of political decisions (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944; Niedermayer, 1990), as well as on the expression of political demands through political participation (van Deth, 1990:276; McDonough, Barnes and López Pina, 1998:936-7). Thirdly, interest in politics can have consequences for the relationship between citizens and their political representatives. When people, as a consequence of being interested, have attitudes towards politics, take decisions related to political matters, and express these attitudes and judgements, they are better able to resist manipulation and to exert control over their political representatives (Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1992; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993:965; Mutz, Sniderman and Brody, 1996). In other words, it is more likely that a citizenship that is

interested in politics has a positive effect on the accountability of politicians than a citizenship that is indifferent towards politics.

I do not ignore the fact that, depending on the sources of interest in politics and, therefore, depending on the nature and meanings of interest in politics, its implications for the aspects just mentioned will vary. In the following lines I will not pay attention to the meanings and consequences of interest in politics but just to its sources. However, one should be aware of the fact that interest in politics may not be related in exactly the same way to other attitudes and behaviours in every single place and at every single time and, therefore, may not always have the same implications.

4- Why Greece and Spain?

The similarities between the histories and many characteristics of Greece and Spain make the case of the different levels of political interest all the more puzzling. As Professor Malefakis has pointed out, the commonalities among the countries of Southern Europe – and, therefore, between Greece and Spain - go beyond the parallel processes toward economic, social and cultural modernization since the early fifties (1995). These commonalities pre-existed and were strongly reinforced during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They can be summarized as follows: "the struggle against absolutism and in favour of liberalism and democratization was mounted very early in the South European countries but had a much rougher road than in the west" of Europe (1995:42).

Under a special heading called "Why Greece fits in with the South" Malefakis highlighted the undeniable fact that "much of its history links it more to the Balkans than to the Italian and Iberian peninsulas". In this sense, the history of the Ottoman Empire provoked a decline in the governmental experience among the elites and the lack of autonomy of Greek society. However, he reminds us that, thanks in part to the Orthodox Church and its privileged position under the Ottoman Empire, Greeks filled the large ecclesiastical bureaucracy which enjoyed unprecedented administrative authority. The presence of Venetian outposts until the late eighteenth century and the interest in Ancient Greece that developed in the Western world since the Renaissance allowed continuous commercial and cultural contact between Greeks and the West. This contact was enhanced by the kind of professions that were left open to the non-Muslims, and especially the Greeks, under the Ottoman Empire. These were precisely the kind of

activities that implied contact with the West, such as finance, commerce, maritime activity, and diplomacy. To all of these facts we can add that one of the main prophets of Greek Independence, Rigas Fereos wrote his famous revolutionary hymn in Vienna as well as his adaptation of the American and French revolutionary declarations that would inspire the war for Greek independence that broke out in 1821. Therefore, some important sectors of Greek society were indeed in touch with the ideals of the Enlightenment.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were, again according to Malefakis, other aspects that were also common to the South European countries: precocious but weak social movements, the protagonism of certain actors and phenomena (army, church, anticlericalism, opportunistic court circles, little organized but frequent labour protests, revolutionary peasants, feelings of national inferiority, strong regional consciousness), a semi urban-semi rural society in which capitalism was early accepted but often questioned. But there is one commonality of the South European region that is of especial relevance for the object of this study: the presence of particularistic politics that have corrupted liberalism, both during the nineteenth and, in rather different forms, also during the twentieth century. While in Spain reference has been made to these practices in order to explain the distance between Spanish citizens and politics (Monzón, 1988:110 and 1992:447), in Greece the argument has been exactly the opposite. One of the most common arguments found in the Greek literature is that interest in politics has been so high amongst the Greeks due to the fact that politics is perceived in a particularistic way[4]. I will come back to this paradox later on.

There is still an additional feature of the recent history of Spain and Greece that only these two countries share and that is of especial relevance for the attitudes of today's citizens towards politics: the civil wars that divided both countries during the second half of the 1930s in Spain and during the second half of the 1940s in Greece. In Spain this traumatic event has often been referred to as the cause of either the automatic rejection of political divisions by Spanish citizens, or as the object of political discourses, both during the Franco regime and during the transition to democracy, that have tried to influence Spanish collective historic memory while, at the same time,

[4] The list of authors that appeal to particularistic politics as an explanation – whether partial or total - for the high levels of interest in politics amongst the Greeks is very extensive. Some of the most relevant are the following: Mouzelis, 1978:145, 1986 and 1995:31-32; Diamandouros, 1983:44-45, 58; Spourdalakis, 1988:18; Charalambis and Demertzis, 1993; Demertzis, 1997.

trying to keep citizens estranged from politics[5]. In Greece, however, the literature on political interest scarcely refers to the reconstruction of the memory about the civil war, nor can we conclude that civil strife automatically results in a gap between citizens and politics[6]. For all these reasons, I think that the comparison between the cases of Spain and Greece offers a particularly interesting occasion for the study of political interest from a perspective that goes beyond both the influence of particularistic politics and the experience of the civil war.

The more recent history of the processes of transition to democracy during the 1970s also allows comparison between these two countries. Finally, the political parties or actors that have played an important political role are also quite similar. The main protagonists of the transitions to democracy were in both cases conservative forces. In spite of their historical relevance communist parties in both cases have remained minoritarian ones. At the beginning of the eighties, what had been until then minoritarian socialist parties won power in both countries. From then on the government has been disputed in both cases between these socialist parties and one conservative party. But in both cases we have been able to speak of predominant parties when referring to the socialist ones. All these similarities support the comparability between these two cases in spite of the inevitable existence of differences between them.

5- Contending explanations

Let's then, analyze the plausibility of each of the three explanations mentioned above: the one based on historical legacies; the one based on processes of political change understood as critical junctures; and, third, the one based on day-to-day politics.

[5] Also in this case, the list of authors that have considered that the civil war has played an important role – either directly or indirectly – in the relationship between Spaniards and politics is very broad. Some of these are Carr and Fusi, 1979; López Pintor, 1982: 78; Montero and Torcal, 1990 and 2002; Aguilar, 1996.

[6] Some exceptions are Pollis (1977:13-14) and Pantelidou-Malouta (1987:241).

5.1- The legacies of the past

The aim of this section is to analyze the plausibility of the explanations based on the history of each country and, more specifically on the history of democracy. We can label this a "cultural explanation" and it is found in the literature that deals with the political culture of both the Spanish and Greek cases. Cultural explanations assume that "the members of different societies are characterized by enduring differences with respect to basic political attitudes, values and skills; that is, by different cultures" (Inglehart, 1991:35). Here, I come back to the paradox I mentioned before. In the two cases, the unstable and incomplete history of democracy has been put forward to explain opposite outcomes. In Greece, part of the literature finds the cause for the *high* levels of interest in politics in the manipulation of democratic processes, in the huge presence of the state, in the weakness of civil society, and in the consequent particularistic perception of politics. However, in some of the Spanish literature these same factors are seen as the causes for the *low* levels of interest in politics in Spain.

In general terms we can identify two kinds of cultural explanations, according to the degree of change in political attitudes they consider possible. On the one hand, we find explanations that can be considered "primordialist" in the sense that they assume that these differences are inherent to the different cultures and, therefore, permanent[7]. On the other hand, there are cultural explanations that admit the possibility that attitudes change, although very slowly, as a result of the socialization during early adulthood of different age cohorts into the predominant political values of the time under different political circumstances. According to this kind of cultural approach, political attitudes acquired during that period of life tend to remain stable, and changes at the aggregate level will only be observed as the oldest cohorts are replaced by the youngest ones (Inglehart, 1991:5). Let's remember that one of the phenomena we want to understand is, precisely, the change in political interest that took place in Greece after 1993. We also want to know if it was some previous change in attitudes that can account for the different levels of interest in politics observed in Spain and Greece during the eighties. Therefore, it is only in the second kind of cultural explanations that can offer a possible answer to our questions.

[7] Laitin has referred to these as the "the first face of culture" (1986).

The idea then is to test the plausibility of the cultural argument based on the history of democracy to explain the different levels and evolution of interest in politics in Greece and Spain. This argument usually assumes that the citizens socialized as young adults under democratic regimes would show higher levels of interest in politics than those socialized under non-democratic regimes. In order to test this idea I have identified several periods in the more or less recent history of these countries according to the degree of democratic openness and, also to other characteristics of the political context such as the degree of mobilization, the degree of repression, or the stability of the political regime. Cohorts have been defined as the groups of individuals that were between 17 and 22 years old during the different periods. The delimitation of this age period attends basically to two criteria, one substantial, and one practical. The substantial reason is that between 17 and 22 is the age when individuals in most democracies first assume political responsibilities, mainly voting (Beck y Jennings, 1991; Johnston, 1992:96; Percheron, 1993:175). The practical reason is that, if we restrict the socialization period to a few years (six in this case), we minimize the possibility that the youngest and the oldest individuals within one same cohort have different perceptions of the political events[8]. The resulting cohorts are five in Spain and six in Greece. In Greece, the cohorts are formed by those who were between 17 and 22 years old during 1) the "national schism" and the Metaxás dictatorship (before 1940), 2) occupation and civil war (1941-49), 3) "watched democracy" (1950-66), 4) Junta (1967-1973), 5) transition and consolidation of democracy (1974-80) and 6) consolidated democracy (1982 and after). In Spain, the cohorts are formed by those individuals that were between 17 and 22 years old during 1) the civil war and the period that preceded it (before 1939), 2) the first period of the Franco regime, characterized by repression and economic autarchy (1940-54), 3) the second period of the Franco regime characterized by a certain openness (1955-76), 4) the period of transition and consolidation of democracy (1977-81), and 5) consolidated democracy (1982 and after)[9].

[8] For a discussion about the problems related with the definition of cohorts, cohort socialization and cohort analysis, see Martín (2004:174-185).

[9] For a more detailed explanation of the individuals that were included in each of the cohorts in our analyses see tables A5 and A6 in the annex. Some clearly distinct periods have been considered as just one for practical rather than substantial reasons. This is clearly the case of the oldest cohorts in the two countries. If we had distinguished two different cohorts – making more sense of history – we would have been left with very few individuals in those cohorts and the statistical analyses would have been invalidated.

I will try to analyze whether the levels of interest in politics in each of these cohorts are different. For this purpose I have designed a multivariate model that will allow us to know to what extent belonging to a specific cohort increases the probability of being interested in politics or not. In this model I have controlled the impact of cohorts for the effect of two of the most influent factors when we refer to political interest: gender and level of education. By introducing these controls we are able to say that, if belonging to a certain cohort increases – or not – the probability of being interested in politics, this occurs no matter whether we are speaking of men or of women, and no matter whether we are referring to individuals that have achieved a high level of education or to individuals that have not had any. I have also controlled the effect of the cohorts for the effect of the "life-cycle"[10].

Graph 3: Interest in politics in the different cohorts

After analyzing the effect that belonging to a certain cohort has on being interested in politics the cohorts socialized under democratic regimes[11] are found to be *less* interested in politics than some of the cohorts socialized under the civil war[12] or even under a non-democratic regime[13]. The results of my analysis suggest that what influences citizens' level of interest in politics is not the history of democracy, but

[10] When analyzing the effect that belonging to a certain cohort may have on the level of interest in politics we face a serious methodological "identification problem" (Fienberg y Mason, 1985). Briefly explained, this consists in the fact that behind the cohorts lie two other, but coincident, variables: "life cycle" and "period". The three variables – "cohort", "life cycle" and "period" – are related in the following way: age=period-cohort, and this creates a statistical problem of multicolinearity that keeps us from being able to identify which of the three is responsible for the effect on political interest.

Although there is no solution to this puzzle there are two mechanisms that can minimize it somehow and that have been applied to this analysis. One is to aggregate several samples of individuals that were interviewed at different points in time and treat them as just one sample. This way we break the multicolinearity between "cohorts" and "life cycle groups". For example, in the new sample we will have two individuals that are considered as being 30 years old, however, one was born in 1983 and the other in 2000. These to individuals will not be placed under the same group in the two variables: they will belong to the same age group - that is in the life-cycle period of the "thirties" - but they will belong to different "cohorts". In this case 13 Spanish surveys and 9 Greek surveys have been used to create an aggregates file. See Table A4 in the annex.

However, the problem of multicolinearity does not disappear completely if we keep introducing the three variables in the model. This is why I have applied a second mechanism to solve this problem: two alternative models. The cohort effect is tested in both but in one of the models it is controlled for the "life-cycle effect" and in the other it is controlled for the "period effect". The results shown in the graphs refer to the first of these models.

[11] In a coloured version of the graphs these are the orange lines.

[12] The black lines.

[13] The green lines.

rather the history of *political mobilization*. In Spain the cohorts that show the highest levels of interest in politics are the cohort socialized during the second phase of the Franco regime (1955-1976), characterized by the gradual revival of civil society, as well as the cohort socialized during the transition and consolidation period (1977-1982), also characterized by higher levels of mobilization than the rest of the historical periods here analyzed[14]. In Greece, the cohorts that declare to have the highest interest in politics are those who were socialized during the previous period to the occupation and during the occupation and the civil war. They are followed by the cohorts that were socialized during the "semi-democratic" period (1950-1966), and during the Junta (1967-1973). Social mobilizations were intense both during the sixties and in 1973[15]. However, neither is an explanation based on the history of political mobilization sufficiently persuasive.

The fact that the youngest cohorts are less interested in politics than the oldest ones, can help us understand the gradual decreasing levels of interest in politics in Greece as young indifferent cohorts are replacing old interested ones. It can also explain the different aggregate levels of interest in politics in Spain and Greece as more living Greeks have been socialized under periods in which political mobilization was intense[16]. But, it would lead us to expect to find decreasing aggregate levels of interest in politics in Spain as well, and this is something we do not observe in the graphs that describe the evolution of aggregate levels of interest in politics in Spain. Nor can it help us understand why *all* the Greek cohorts have a higher level of interest in politics than the Spanish ones.

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[14] For a history of social movements in Spain during the twentieth century see Álvarez Junco (1994). About the mobilizations carried out by the workers and the students during the fifties, sixties and seventies see Maravall (1978).

[15] For a complete revision of the characteristics of social mobilization in Greece between 1949 and 1967 see Bernardakis and Mavris (1991). About mobilizations during the Greek transition to democracy see Bemardakis (1995).

[16] Notice that until they reach 30 the likelihood of being interested in politics of all the cohorts except the youngest one is higher than that of any of the Spanish cohorts. This kind of explanation assumes that political attitudes within each cohort are the same in all of the years analyzed. This is why it cannot account for the likely decrease of interest in politics in all of the Greek cohorts from 1993 onwards. The model could be improved by introducing interaction terms that would tell us whether the relationship of interest in politics and age is the same in all cohorts or not.

[18] The most representative works that have put the emphasis on this kind of explanations are Paramio and Reverte (1980), Maravall (1982), Del Águila and Montoro (1984), Edles (1990), Morán (1997), Benedicto (1997) and Powell (2000:237).

This is why it becomes necessary to analyze the plausibility of the other two types of explanation based on critical junctures and on day to day politics. It could be that the gradual decrease of interest in politics we find in Greece is not due to generational replacement (remember we do not find this in Spain, although we should according to the lower levels of interest in politics amongst the youngest cohorts) but to a phenomenon that affects all cohorts since the beginning of the nineties. This is a hypothesis that needs to be explained under the "day to day politics" approach since it could be a rather rapid change in attitudes as a reaction of the performance of political actors and institutions. Secondly, it could be that the levels of interest in politics are higher in all of the Greek cohorts (at least until 1993), as a result of a change in attitudes that took place during the critical juncture of the process of transition and consolidation of democracy in this country. Did this process have a more intense mobilizing effect of society at large in Greece than in Spain? Let us first examine this explanation based on the intense and lasting effect that critical junctures can have on political attitudes.

5.2- The impact of critical junctures: transitions to democracy

Were the characteristics of the processes of transition and consolidation of democracy in each of these two countries responsible for the different levels of interest in politics observed during the eighties and the nineties? At first sight it seems a reasonable explanation that the decisions taken by the political elites during this period about how much to mobilize society could have implied a redefinition of the relationship between citizens and politics that marked a rupture with the past and the beginning of a diverging trajectory in the political culture of these two countries. According to Collier and Collier critical junctures are "periods during which an important change takes place, that usually adopts distinctive characteristics in each country (or unity of analysis), and of which different legacies are derived" (1991:29). Given the relevance of the changes that took place during the processes of transition and consolidation of democracy, and their foundational character with respect to the new democratic regime, we could think that the kind of relationship between citizens and politics that was built during this period could have had a lasting effect on interest in politics. This redefinition of the relationship between citizens and politics could have implied a relatively rapid change in the political attitudes of all the cohorts, independently of their age.

Reference to this argument has been quite frequent in the Spanish case[18]. The *consensual nature* of the transition to democracy, *ideological moderation* and the *lack of political mobilization* by the political elites in Spain during this process have been said to have had long lasting effects on citizens' indifference towards politics. On the contrary, in Greece, these processes were characterized by the unilateral decisions taken by the Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlís, by the radical discourse of the opposition forces – especially by PASOK – and by the much more intense political mobilization by the parties of the left[19]. But, in order to be able to say that these differences were the result of decisions deliberately taken by the political elites, we should be able to show that the confining conditions that limited their capacity for manoeuvring were similar, and not too strong, in both countries. Otherwise, we would not be able to speak of a critical juncture since the constrictions of the past would leave too little room as to allow for different possible trajectories. Most of the literature has emphasized the greater constrictions in the case of the transition to democracy in Spain than in Greece. The transactions between the elites of the outgoing regime and the new democratic elites implied a much greater risk on involution in the Spanish case than in the case of Greece where the authoritarian regime had collapsed. The attempted coup d'état that took place in Spain on the 23 of February 1981 has often been used as the demonstration that important threats – especially those coming from the Armed Forces – were menacing the democratization process from the very beginning.

However, we have several reasons to doubt about the relationship between a negotiated transition and low levels of interest in politics. An analysis of the evolution of political interest in Spain during the late 1970s does not allow us to conclude that the politics of *pacts and consensus* had a negative impact on interest in politics in Spain (graph 4). On the contrary, interest in politics rose during the years 1977 and 1978 when the main negotiations between the political elites were taking place.

Graph 4: Interest in politics during the Spanish transition to democracy

We have a second reason to argue that pacts between the elites were not at the roots of political indifference in Spain and this is the fact that there were also pacts in Greece. It is true that the constitutional processes was not based on consensus but on the

[19] About the types of transition processes that took place in these two countries see, among others, O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1989) and Linz and Stepan (1996).

unilateral decisions taken by the Primer Minister Karamanlís and that this had as a result the negative vote of PASOK when the Constitution was voted in Parliament in June 1975. However, there were pacts between government and opposition in other matters such as in order to impose the supremacy of civil authorities over military ones[20], to have a critical stance towards NATO for its passivity during the Cyprus crisis, and to narrow the relationship between Greece and the Balkan countries (Agüero, 1995:391-92). None of these pacts seemed to have the effect of decreasing interest in politics amongst the Greeks in later years.

Although the relationship between a negotiated transition and lower levels of interest in politics are not at all evident, there are stronger grounds for arguing that both *ideological moderation and political demobilization* during the processes of transition and consolidation of democracy may have contributed to the different levels of political interest observed during the following years in both Spain and Greece. Although pacts with political forces from a different ideological sign are usually accompanied by ideological moderation, this is not always the case. It was so in the case of the Spanish socialist party (PSOE) that soon abandoned its rupturist strategy (after the referendum about the Law of Political Reform in December 1976). Its definite ideological moderation came in September 1979, after the first two general elections, when it abandoned its self-definition as a Marxist party. In the case of the Greek socialist party one could say that their discourse was more radical in relative terms. However, this radicalism cannot be understood unless it is placed in the context of the unilateral decisions taken by the Prime Minister Karamanlís. PASOK did not have time to moderate its discourse before the first general elections of November 1974, like PSOE did. The fact that these elections were celebrated so early was also one of the reasons for the radicalization of the opposition parties of the left – mainly the recently created PASOK – for it did not leave them time to organize their electoral campaign. Radicalization was also fostered by the exclusive character of the constitutional process in which only representatives or the right and centre forces participated. It cannot be ignored either, that from 1975 on, PASOK started a process of ideological moderation

[20] Psomiades has said that, in spite of its radical discourse, PASOK never questioned the democratic regime and abstained from any actions that could have been interpreted as a provocation or a pretext for a military intervention (Psomiades, 1982:259). The collaboration between the elites was also evident when Karamanlís had to calm down the Armed Forces after PASOK's victory in the 1981 elections (Psomiades, 1982:266). Papandreu's laudatory comments in 1987 about the successful management of the military issue by Karamanlís during the transition to democracy point in the same direction (Agüero, 1995:392, n.40).

during which it came to abandon the term socialist as part of its self definition in 1977 Spourdalakis (1988:190)[21].

But it is true that during the first years PASOK's discourse was radical in the sense that it called for a class struggle in opposition to the government's appeal to national unity; it defended an independent and "thirdworldist" strategy as opposed to what it considered a government too dependent on the United States' imperialism; and it called for socialist self-management as opposed to what it saw as the reconstruction of a parliamentarian oligarchy (Kaftantzoglou, 1979:50, 54-55). During the first years PASOK's discourse was more radical than the Communists' (Kaftantzoglou, 1979; Spoudalakis, 1988:78; Karakatsanis, 2001:10)[22] and in relation to Greece's integration in the European Community it kept a critical stance until 1985 (Verney, 1993:139). This is why we could expect a higher interest in politics amongst the Greeks as a result of the mobilizing capacity of the radical discourse of PASOK during this crucial period of political change.

The differences between the aspects of the transition and consolidation processes in Greece and Spain become even clearer when we focus on party mobilization. The organizational mobilization carried out by PASOK – and the rest of the parties as a reaction to its strategy – was considerably higher than that carried out by PSOE (and the rest of the Spanish parties). In Spain the intense mobilizations that had characterized the political scene during the second half of 1976 and the first half of 1977 entered a decline after the legalization of the Communist Party in April 1977 and, especially after the first general elections that took place in June that year. In Greece the trend followed by social mobilization was the opposite. It was characterized by a spontaneous and not structured character until 1977 but, starting the summer of 1977 social mobilization became part of the successful electoral strategy of PASOK. This included both the development of a party organization all over the country and the collaboration or cooptation of the social movements[23]. This process culminated in the electoral campaign of 1981. Spourdalakis has said that the mobilizational strategy of PASOK implied, not only a redefinition of the electoral rules but of Greek politics in

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[21] About the gradual moderation of PASOK's discourse see Lyrintzis (1984:111); Elephantis (1981:116, 129), Spourdalakis (1988) and Karakatsanis (2001:127 ff.)

[22] Although one could also find a parallelism in this respect between PASOK and PSOE. For example, PSOE accepted the monarchy only after PCE did.

[23] About the development of both these processes see Elephantis (1981); Fakiolas (1987); Spourdalakis (1988) and Bernardakis (1995).

general (1988:209). The comparison between the number of party members between 1974 and 1982 speaks for itself and reinforces the idea that the intense party mobilization that took place in Greece during these years could be at the basis of the different levels of interest in politics during the eighties and beginning of the nineties (table 1).

Table 1: Evolution of the number of party members during the transition and consolidation of democracy in Spain and Greece[24]

PSOE[25]	AP/ CD[26]	PCE[27]		PASOK[28]	ND[29]	KKE	KKE-es
3.000		15.000	**1974**				
			1975	8.000			
6.000			**1976**		20.000		
51.552		191.607	**1977**	27.000	20.000		
		156.184	**1978**		100.000		
101.082	5.000		**1979**	65.000	150.000		
			1980	75.000			
99.408	20.000	132.069	**1981**	110.000			
112.591	85.412		**1982**				

Number of party members. There are no data for KKE and KKE-es for this period.
Several sources.

These differences could be attributed to the lower risk of involution in the Greek than in the Spanish process of transition and consolidation of democracy. If this were so we would not be able to say that they were part of the choices made by the political elites during a critical juncture that were responsible for the different trajectories followed in each of the countries thereafter. However, there are several arguments that support the idea that the confining conditions were similar in both countries and, therefore, that the different mobilizational strategies were the product of elite choice[30].

[24] Due to the nature of these data, it is necessary not to interpret them literally. In order to be able to compare the numbers between the two countries it will be useful to take into account that the population size in Spain and Greece, respectively, was 35.3 and 9 millions in 1974 and 37.9 and 9.8 millions in 1982 (European Economy, 2001:114).

[25] The data for PSOE come from Gangas (1995:144) and Colomé (1998:272). Other sources provide slightly different numbers such as, for example, 2.548 in 1974 (Míguez, 1990:240 cit. Powell, 2002:67), 9.000 in 1976 (Satrústegui, 1992:39) or 150.000 in 1979 (Colomé, 1998:272).

[26] Most of the data for PP come from López Nieto (1998:257) who refers to them as oficial party data.

[27] Ramiro (2003:80). The data for PCE in 1974 come from Míguez (1990:240 cit. Powell, 2002:67).

[28] Spourdalakis (1998:400). According to Lyrintzis in 1980 the number was 60.000 (1984:111).

[29] The data for ND come from Kalyvas (1998:93), Pappas (1999:177) and Morlino (1998:179,204).

[30] Not only was the risk of involution as important in Greece as it was in Spain, but the Spanish elites not always perceived the risk in their country as being as important as most of the literature has emphasized later one. After the first general elections of June 1977 the big, most risky, decisions had been taken and the overall perception was that the worst was already gone. This perception was even clearer when the politics of consensus was broken during the 1979 electoral campaign (Malefakis, 1982:226; Agüero, 1995:391-392).

The two most revealing ones are the fact that the rupture with the non-democratic regime was not as clear in Greece as has often been assumed and the fact that the Armed Forces posed a threat during the Greek process of political change to a similar extent as they did in Spain[31]. The authoritarian regime in Greece collapsed but this did not necessarily imply a rupture since there was no actor that could develop it. The one who finally did, Konstantinos Karamanlís, was called to lead the process by the President of the outgoing regime, General Gizikis, and the links with the outgoing regime were noticeable since, for example, three of the ministers – Vitsio, Gikas and Averof – had been related to the Junta (Kaftantzoglou, 1979:59-61). Therefore, collapse does not necessarily mean rupture. Secondly, the fact that the threat of a coup d'état only materialized itself in the case of Spain does not mean that this threat was not as present in Greece. In fact, several conspiracies were discovered and one could say that the risk of a military coup did not disappear until 1983 (Karakatsanis, 2001:154-156).

But, once more, an explanation based on the different mobilizational strategies during the critical process of political change is not completely satisfactory when it comes to trying to understand the levels and evolution of political interest in Spain and Greece during the eighties and the nineties. Critical junctures are supposed to have a lasting effect that will be resistant to change until a new critical juncture arises. No political process during the democratic period can be compared to the transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one or to the period of consolidation of the new democratic regime. Why, then, has interest in politics decreased amongst the Greeks after 1993? This is why I think it necessary to explore a more dynamic explanation based on day-to-day politics.

[31] For other arguments that support the idea that the risk of involution was similar in the two countries see Martín (2004:289-302).

5.3- Day to day politics

The main argument regarding day to day politics is that the discourse of political parties is a changing one, and that it has a "running" effect on citizens' interest in politics. Both *ideology* and *perception of differences between the discourses of the main parties* can provoke changes in citizens' interest in politics. The analysis I have carried out reveals that a leftist ideology can foster interest in politics and that a centre ideology may have the opposite effect. A right-wing ideology would be somewhere in between. Also, the more differences citizens perceive between parties – whether ideological or otherwise– the more interested they will be in politics. One third factor that I show to have an effect on the level of interest in politics is *party mobilization* during periods of rutinary politics. This is shown by the fact that the voters of some parties are more interested in politics than others and that their different levels of interest have nothing to do with the parties' or the citizens' ideology, nor with the cohort they belong to, their age, their gender or their level of education (table 2)[32].

[32] The analysis is a binomial logistic regression in which the variables "ideology", "party preference / vote intention" and "polarization / perception of differences between the political parties" have been added to those variables already included in the model that was designed to test the effect that belonging to a certain cohort had on being more or less interested in politics.

Tabla 2.1. Political explanations of interest in politics in Spain and Greece controlling for the LIFE-CYCLE EFFECT – Logistic regression models

		SPAIN				GREECE		
		Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**		**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Sociodemographic variables	**Gender**	0,61*	0,60*	0,56*		0,58*	0,57*	--
	Level of education	0,83*	0,81*	0,75*		0,43*	0,48*	--
		0,00	0,00	0,00		-0,02*	-0,03*	--
Cohorts	**Cohort 1: Before end of civil war**	0,07	0,15	0,39	**Cohort 1: Before occupation**	1,49*	2,19*	--
	Cohort 2: First Franco period	0,32*	0,33*	0,34*	**Cohort 2: Occupation and civil war**	1,47*	1,94*	--
	Cohort 3: Opening of Franco regime	0,64*	0,57*	0,57*	**Cohort 3: Semi-democracy**	1,31*	1,61*	--
	Cohort 4: Transition and consolid.	0,35*	0,26*	0,23*	**Cohort 4: Junta**	0,95*	1,07*	--
					Cohort 5: Transition and consolid.	0,66*	0,68*	--
Ideology	**Extreme left**	1,40*	1,22*	1,06*		1,13*	1,07*	--
	Left	0,81*	0,74*	0,55*		0,78*	0,70*	--
	Right	0,59*	0,38*	0,29*		0,25*	0,26*	--
	Extreme right	0,72*	0,51*	0,61*		0,35*	0,38*	--
Party preferences (vote intention)	**PSOE**	--	0,50*	0,45*	**PASOK**	--	0,78*	--
	PP	--	0,74*	0,64*	**ND**	--	0,51*	--
	IU	--	0,92*	0,87*	**KKE**	--	0,79*	--
	Another party				**KKE-es**	--	0,28	--
	All parties are the same	--	0,95*	0,71*	**Another party**	--	0,05	--
Polarization	**Gender**	--	--	-0,96*		--	--	--
	Constant	-2,76*	-2,98*	-2,29*		-0,95*	-1,00*	--
	Nagelkerke R^2	0,18	0,20	0,24		0,12	0,15	--
	N	62.745	62.745	18.568	N	15.653	15.653	--

Reference category of cohorts "Cohort socialized during the consolidated democracy (80s and 90s)".
Reference category of ideology "Centre".
Reference category of party preference "Did not vote / blank / not valid".
* Significant p<0,05.
Note: In Greece the model that intends to measure the impact of polarization controlling for age presents multicollineality problems as measured by the tolerance statistic and by the Variante Inflation Factor (VIF).

Table 2.2. Political explanations of interest in politics in Spain and Greece controlling for the PERIOD EFFECT – Logistic regression models

		SPAIN				GREECE		
		Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**		**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Socio-demographic variables	**Gender**	0,61*	0,60*	0,55*		0,59*	0,59*	0,45*
	Level of education	0,83*	0,81*	0,75*		0,47*	0,51*	0,46*
Cohorts		--	--	--	**Cohort 1: Before occupation**	0,45*	0,34*	0,55*
	Cohort 1: Before end of civil war	0,10	-0,01	0,31*	**Cohort 2: Occupation and civil war**	0,65*	0,51*	0,65*
	Cohort 2: First Franco period	0,34*	0,21*	0,28*	**Cohort 3: Semi-democracy**	0,74*	0,61*	0,70*
	Cohort 3: Opening of Franco regime	0,66*	0,52*	0,54*	**Cohort 4: Junta**	0,64*	0,51*	0,55*
	Cohort 4: Transition and consolid	0,36*	0,24*	0,22*	**Cohort 5: Transition and consolid**	0,43*	0,33*	0,18
Ideology	**Extreme left**	1,41*	1,23*	1,06*		1,14*	1,10*	0,98*
	Left	0,82*	0,75*	0,55*		0,81*	0,72*	0,59*
	Right	0,59*	0,39*	0,30*		0,22*	0,26*	0,06
	Extreme right	0,72*	0,51*	0,61*		0,32*	0,38*	0,01
Party preferences (vote intention)	**PSOE**	--	0,49*	0,45*	**PASOK**	--	0,76*	0,48*
	PP	--	0,73*	0,62*	**ND**	--	0,46*	0,36*
	IU	--	0,92*	0,87*	**KKE**	--	0,67*	0,39
		--	--	--	**KKE-es**	--	0,42*	0,62
	Another party	--	0,95*	0,72*	**Another party**	--	0,09	-0,19
Polarization	**All parties are the same**	--	--	-0,98*		--	--	-0,96*

(Continued)

(Continuation of Table 2.2)

		SPAIN			GREECE		
		Model 1	**Model 1**	**Model 1**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Period effect	**Year 1983**	-0,11	-0,06	--	0,11	0,64*	--
	Year 1984	-0,05	0,00	--	--	--	--
	Year 1985	-0,03	0,04	-0,07	0,68*	0,76*	-0,16
	Year 1986	0,15*	0,22*	--	--	--	--
	Year 1988	-0,04	0,00	-0,01	0,61*	0,71*	--
	Year 1989	-0,02	0,03	-0,11	0,87*	0,93*	--
	Year 1990	-0,08	-0,10	-0,24*	0,70*	0,74*	--
	Year 1991	-0,10	-0,07	-0,16	--	--	--
	Year 1992	-0,11	-0,05	--	--	--	--
	Year 1993	0,01	0,06	--	0,55*	0,56*	--
	Year 1994	0,16*	0,15*	--	--	--	--
	Year 1995	--	--	--	-0,05	0,00	--
	Year 1996	0,06	0,02	-0,05	0,07	0,09	--
	Constant	-2,77	-3,08	-2,22	--	--	--
	Nagelkerke R^2	0,18	0,20	0,24	0,15	0,16	0,18
	N	62.832	62.832	18.588	15.801	15.801	3.050

Reference category of cohorts "Cohort socialized during the consolidated democracy (80s and 90s)".
Reference category of ideology "Centre".
Reference category of period effect "Year 2000" ("Year 1990" in the model for Greece in which the polarization variable is introduced).
Reference category of party preference "Did not vote / blank / not valid".
* Significant p<0,05.

It is the specific mobilizing strategies used by each of the parties that seem to play the crucial role. Overall, during the period 1983-2000 the most successful party strategies in promoting interest in politics amongst their voters have proven to be the following. In the case of Greece, both the Communist (*KKE*) and the Socialist Party (*PASOK*) have mobilized the political interest of their voters to a similar extent and they have been more successful in doing so than the Greek Popular Party (*Nea Dimocratía*). In Spain the nationalist parties and *Izquierda Unida* (United Left) have mobilized the political interest of their voters to a greater extent than the main two parties. However, the *Partido Popular* (Popular Party) has been more successful in this sense than the Socialist Party.

The analysis of the evolution of the relationship between these three political variables – ideology, polarization and party mobilization – through bivariate analysis together with the narrative of events prove illuminating[33]. First of all, they reveal that the evolution of interest in politics in Spain has been much more dynamic than what the analysis of the aggregate data allows us see. The relationship between political interest, on the one hand, and ideology or party preferences, on the other, has proven to be a changing one in the two countries. As the political discourse of the main parties has become more moderate and moved closer to the centre, the proportion of citizens that place themselves near the centre of the ideological spectrum has also increased. As we saw in the multivariate analysis, centrist ideology is the one that appears least likely to foster interest in politics. In other cases the discourse of political parties has become similar with respect to non-ideological issues, or less confrontational, or less credible. This has given rise to a different kind of depolarization and to an increase in the proportion of citizens sharing the impression that "all parties are alike". This perception also leads to a decrease in interest in politics.

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[33] Neither the bivariate analyses, nor the narrative of events are included here. For more details see Martín (2004:340-401). In any case, this is not the ideal method for this purpose, but there were important data constraints on following a multivariate strategy which would have been the ideal way to carry out this analysis. In order to be able to control the effect of the cohorts for the effect of age without facing multicolinearity problems I had to carry out a pooled logistic regression. This method does not allow us to obtain a dynamic view of the relationships analyzed. If I had carried out one logistic regression for each of the years I would have confronted two problems. First of all, the different sampling methods used by the different institutes would not have allowed me to compare the non-standardized coefficients of each variable across surveys. A second problem would have been that of multicolinearity when trying to control for both the effect of cohorts and the effect of age. A more detailed analysis of the dynamics of party mobilization and interest in politics would require a more complex analysis and, probably, the introduction of interaction terms in the statistical model I have used. This is one of the possible lines of research for the future.

Each of these processes of moderation and depolarization has followed a rhythm of its own in each of the two countries. This is what explains the different evolution of political interest in Spain and Greece.

Graph 5: Interest in politics and party mobilization

As we can see in graph 5, in the case of Greece radical discourse, polarization and mobilization were intense during the eighties, especially on the part of the Communist and the Socialist parties. The process of moderation, depolarization, and demobilization followed by the two main parties increased from 1993 onwards and it found a reflection in the decreasing interest in politics of their voters. Only the Communist Party, after 1991, has been able to maintain the levels of political interest amongst its voters through the radicalization of its discourse and its appeal to mobilization. Therefore, a leftist polarizing discourse and party mobilization fostered interest in politics in Greece during the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties[34].

In Spain the Socialist party adopted a more moderate ideological discourse and the relationship between the two main parties was not, in general, a polarized one, at least until 1993. However, interest in politics has proven to be sensitive to changes in the mobilizing strategies followed by parties. As you can see in the second graph, this was the case during the mid-1980s when the left mobilized its voters against the Spanish membership of NATO. But this has also been the case of the organizational changes produced in the Popular Party after its re-foundation during the early nineties. The emphasis of the Spanish Popular Party on organizational mobilization has been able to counter the demobilizing effects of its process of moderation and towards a centre-like discourse. At the aggregate level it has also been able to counter the diminishing interest in politics amongst the voters of *Izquierda Unida*[35].

[34] However, because these factors were combined with populist elements - that is, with the excessive simplification of reality and of political antagonisms – they led to a formalistic kind of political interest (see Martín, 2004).

[35] In this case it has not been due to moderation but to the distance between voter's ideological preferences and the party's. In the case of IU the party has followed a more radical discourse than that of its voters.

6- Concluding remarks

I have tried to argue that, contrary to what much of the literature has insistently argued, citizens' interest in politics is not so resistant to change. The levels and changes observed in citizens' interest in politics depend on the discursive, ideological and mobilizing strategies that political parties decide to implement as part of the normal development of political life. In other words, day-to-day party politics has an influence on the level of interest that citizens have in politics and its aggregate levels are not only dependent on history or culture.

The main conclusion can therefore be summed up as follows: only the changes observed in the degree of polarization, ideology and mobilization of political parties during day-to-day politics can help us understand the evolution and meaning of interest in politics in Spain and Greece during the democratic period. The history of each country and theories based on socialization during young adulthood can explain why more Greeks are interested in politics. More Greek than Spanish cohorts have been socialized under periods of intense political mobilization. But they do not explain the evolution of interest in politics. Why does interest not decline in Spain in spite of the fact that younger cohorts are less interested in politics? The visions and decisions of the political elites during the critical juncture of transition and consolidation of democracy offer and explanation for the higher levels of interest found in all the Greek cohorts when compared to the Spanish ones. The degree of party mobilization during the consolidation of democracy was more intense than its equivalent in Spain. But, again, it does not offer an explanation for its decline in Greece after 1993. Like I say, only the evolution of the three political variables mentioned during the eighties and nineties can give us a clue about the changes in political interest occurred both in Greece and in Spain.

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Graph 1: Levels and evolution of interest in politics in Spain and Greece, 1983-2002



Graph 2: Interest in politics in Spain and Greece within the EU, 1983-1998



Graph 3: Interest in politics in the different cohorts
(probabilities controlled for age, gender and level of education)





Graph 4: Interest in politics during the final phase of the Franco regime and the Spanish transition to democracy[38]



Source: ICSA/Gallup series (Monzón, 1988).



Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Series 18900

[38] Two different graphs are shown because the wording of the questions differed in the surveys included in each of them. In the first graph percentages are for those citizens who said they were "very" and "quite" interested in politics while in the second they are for citizens who said they were "very" and "so-so" (*regular*) interested in politics.

Graph 5: Interest in politics and party mobilization





ANNEX

Table A.1. Time series of "interest in politics" – Greece (1985-2002)

GREECE			
Institute	**Year**	**Month**	**Sample size**
EKKE (*Four Nation Study*)*	1985	May	1.998
EKKE	1988	May-June	3.000
EKKE*	1989 A	June	1.996
EKKE*	1989 B	October	1.200
EKKE*	1990	April	1.200
Opinion*	1993	September	2.009
V-PRC (*PASOK*)	1995	June	3.000
MRB (*Mega*)	1995	--	1.500
EKKE (*CNEP*)**[39]	1996	September-October	1.196
Opinion (*Elefcerotipía*)	1999	October	1.614
MRB (*Mega*)*	2000	February	2.000
MRB (*Mega*)*	2000	March	2.000
Opinion (*Elefcerotipía*)*	2000	October	1.607
Opinion (*Elefcerotipía*)	2001	November	1.600
Opinion (*Elefcerotipía*)	2002	--	1.000

* Pre-electoral survey
** Pre and post-electoral survey
In parenthesis is the name of the project (1985 y 1996) or of the institution that ordered the study.
-- Unknown.

[39] The pre-electoral survey was carried out between 7-13 September and ended befote the televised debate between Simitis and Evert, according to the CNEP rules. The post-electoral survey took place between 1-10 October, the sample size was 996.

Table A.2. Time series of "interest in politics" CIS – Wording "quite interested" (1983-2002)

SPAIN Series nb. 200 "Quite"				
Institute	**Study number**	**Year**	**Month**	**Sample size**
CIS	1355	1983	May	3.368
CIS	1380	1983	November	11.077
CIS	1390	1984	January	2.948
CIS	1430	1984	October	2.505
CIS	1453	1985	March	2.493
CIS	1461	1985	May	2.498
CIS	1471	1985	July	2.479
CIS	1517	1986	February	2.454
CIS	1526	1986	April	25.667
CIS	1529	1986	May	4.429
CIS	1559	1986	November	2.493
CIS	1567	1986	December	2.488
CIS	1740	1988	April	2.496
CIS	1788	1989	January	3.356
CIS	1789	1989	February	27.287
CIS	1803	1989	April	2.499
CIS	1808	1989	May	3.072
CIS	1838	1989	September	2.471
CIS	1870	1990	April	2.895
CIS	1871	1990	May	2.876
CIS	1970	1991	June	2.471
CIS	2013	1992	June	2.495
CIS	2055	1993	April	2.500
CIS	2062	1993	June	2.500
CIS	2083	1994	February	2.499
CIS	2212	1996	April	2.499
CIS	2382 / 2384	2000	May	24.040
CIS	2450	2002	November	4.252

Table A.3. Eurobarometers containing the question about "interest in politics" (1983-1998)

Study number	**Year**	**Month**	**Sample size**	
			Greece	**Spain**
EB 19 *	1983	Mar-Apr	1.000	--
EB 30	1988	Oct-Nov	1.000	1.013
EB 31	1989	Mar-Apr	1.000	1.001
EB 31A	1989	Jun-Jul	1.000	1.003
EB 32	1989	Oct-Nov	1.007	992
EB 33	1990	Mar-Apr	1.003	1.004
EB 34	1990	Oct-Nov	1.008	1.001
EB 41.1	1994	Jun-Jul	1.002	1.000
EB 42	1994	Dec	1.002	1.006
EB 49	1998	Apr-May	1.013	1.000

* Spain was not yet an EC member.

Table A.4. Surveys and variables included in the "aggregated file".

	Gender	Level of education	Age / Cohorts	Ideology	Vote intention	All parties are alike
Spanish surveys						
CIS 1380 – November 1983	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 1390 – January 1984	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 1461 - May 1985	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 1517 – February 1986	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 1740 – April 1988	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 1788 – January 1989	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 1870 – April 1990	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 1970 – June 1991	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 2013 – June 1992	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 2055 – April 1993	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 2083 – February 1994	X	X	X	X	X	
CIS 2212 - April 1996	X	X	X	X	X	X
CIS 2382 / 84 – May 2000	X	X	X	X	X	X
Greek surveys						
Eurobarometer 19 - 1983	X	X	X	X	X	
EKKE – May 1985	X	X	X	X	X	X
EKKE – May/June 1988	X	X	X	X	X	
EKKE – October 1989	X	X	X	X	X	
EKKE – April 1990	X	X	X	X	X	X
Opinion – September 1993	X	X	X	X	X	
VPRC – June 1995	X	X	X	X	X	
EKKE – September 1996	X	X	X	X	X	
Opinion - 2000	X	X	X	X	X	

Note: The syntax file with which I have standardized the variables of the different surveys that form this file can be made available by the author.

Table A.5. Spanish surveys: Cohorts from youngest to oldest as used in the statistical analysis

	DEMOCRACY		DICTATORSHIP		
	80s and 90s	Trans. and cons.	Openning of Franco regime	Repression and autarchy	Civil war and before
1979		18-19	20-41	42-56	57-98
1980		18-20	21-42	43-57	58-98
1982		18-22	23-44	45-59	60-98
1983	18	19-23	24-45	46-60	61-98
1984	18-19	20-24	25-46	47-61	62-98
1985	18-20	21-25	26-47	48-62	63-98
1986	18-21	22-26	27-48	49-63	64-98
1989	18-24	25-29	30-51	52-66	67-98
1990	18-25	26-30	31-52	53-67	68-98
1991	18-26	27-31	32-53	54-68	69-98
1993	18-28	29-33	34-55	56-70	71-98
1994	18-29	30-34	35-56	57-71	72-98
1996	18-31	32-36	37-58	59-73	74-98
1998	18-33	34-38	39-60	61-75	76-98
2000	18-35	36-40	41-62	63-77	78-98
2002	18-37	38-42	43-64	65-79	80-98

Table A.6. Greek surveys: Cohorts from youngest to oldest as used in the statistical analysis

	DEMOCRACY		DICTATORSHIP	SEMI-DEM.		
	80s and 90s	Trans. and cons.	Junta	Semi-dem	Occup. and civil war	"Schism" and Metaxas
1983	18-19	20-25	26-34	35-50	51-59	60-98
1985	18-21	22-27	28-36	37-52	53-61	62-98
1988	18-24	25-30	31-39	40-55	56-64	65-98
1989	18-25	26-31	32-40	41-56	57-65	66-98
1990	18-26	27-32	33-41	42-57	58-66	67-98
1993	18-29	30-35	36-44	45-60	61-69	70-98
1995	18-31	32-37	38-46	47-62	63-71	72-98
1996	18-32	33-38	39-47	48-63	64-72	73-98
2000	18-36	37-42	43-51	52-67	68-76	77-98
2001	18-37	38-43	44-52	53-68	69-77	78-98
2002	18-38	39-44	45-53	54-69	70-78	79-98